CASPs Through the Lens of MiFID: Toward a Mifidisation of the Crypto Market?

The CASP regime introduced by MiCA is often described as a bespoke framework tailored to the specificities of crypto-assets. Yet its conceptual DNA is unmistakably marked by MiFID II. This article argues that the European Union has initiated an embryonic “mifidisation” of the crypto ecosystem by constructing CASPs as functional analogues of investment firms, even though the technological foundations of crypto markets fundamentally differ from those presupposed by MiFID.

The adoption of the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA) introduces a new regulatory category in European law: the Crypto-Asset Service Provider (CASP). Although presented as a sui generis creature tailored to the specificities of the crypto-asset ecosystem, the CASP is not conceptually autonomous. Its architecture is deeply influenced by the logic of MiFID II (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive), the cornerstone of European financial regulation. The resemblance is not superficial. It raises a question that is both doctrinal and structural: is the European Union progressively engaging in a “mifidisation” of the crypto market? In other words, does MiCA, by creating CASPs and subjecting them to obligations analogous to investment firms, replicate the conceptual grid of MiFID and thereby re-embed the crypto ecosystem within traditional financial categories?

Answering this question requires more than a simple comparison of two regulatory lists. It involves analysing the functional logic behind each regime, the conceptual premises underlying the notion of a service provider, and the tensions that emerge when an institutional regulatory model is transposed into a technological environment characterised by decentralisation and automation. This article argues that MiCA clearly initiates a movement of convergence with MiFID — an embryonic mifidisation — yet this process remains partial and unstable. MiFID is premised upon the existence of identifiable intermediaries with discretionary powers, whereas crypto markets increasingly rely on decentralised protocols, permissionless trading architectures and algorithmic execution pathways. The tension between these two models shapes the evolving identity of the CASP.

I. The CASP as a Functional Transposition of the MiFID Investment Firm

The CASP emerges in MiCA as a functional analogue to the investment firm. MiCA defines crypto-asset services by reproducing, in almost identical terms, the service categories that under MiFID structure the entire market of investment services and activities. The operation of a trading platform, the custody and administration of assets, the execution of orders on behalf of clients, the placement of instruments, the reception and transmission of orders, portfolio management and even advisory activities echo the conceptual architecture of MiFID II. This deliberate symmetry reflects the legislator’s intention to regulate the crypto ecosystem through a conceptual language already stabilised in financial law, thereby reducing the interpretive uncertainty inherent in an emerging technological domain.

This mirroring is not an accident of legislative drafting. It reveals the legislator’s conviction that the crypto market, despite its technological singularities, can and should be governed by institutional principles originally designed for financial intermediaries. The CASP is therefore less an innovation than a recontextualisation of the investment firm. MiCA borrows the structural vocabulary of MiFID because it needs a framework capable of imposing professional standards, organisational duties, prudential requirements and behavioural norms. In this sense, mifidisation constitutes a functional necessity: without it, the crypto ecosystem would remain normatively indeterminate, making supervisory oversight extremely difficult.

II. The Convergence of Regulatory Duties: CASPs as Crypto Investment Firms

The convergence between MiCA and MiFID is particularly visible in the obligations imposed on CASPs. MiCA requires that CASPs act with professionalism, integrity and diligence, manage conflicts of interest, ensure operational resilience, safeguard their clients’ assets and provide information that is clear and non-misleading. These duties, although expressed in a different regulatory vocabulary, replicate the normative core of MiFID II. The prudential dimension also echoes MiFID: requirements relating to governance structures, internal control, capital adequacy and risk management align CASPs with the institutional discipline traditionally imposed on investment firms.

Market integrity constitutes another area of convergence. By extending the logic of the Market Abuse Regulation to crypto-assets admitted to trading, MiCA transposes entire sections of securities regulation into the crypto sphere. Once a token is made available for trading, the conduct obligations imposed on actors resemble those governing financial markets. This mechanism reinforces the impression of conceptual assimilation: the CASP becomes, functionally, a crypto version of the investment firm, subject to parallel duties designed to secure market order, protect investors and mitigate systemic risks.

This convergence is further reinforced by passporting mechanisms. Like MiFID investment firms, authorised CASPs can provide services across the Union through a single licence. The structural resemblance is therefore institutional as well as functional. The CASP regime thus appears as an adaptation of MiFID’s internal market logic to the crypto domain.

III. Structural Limits: Why CASPs Cannot Fully Become MiFID Intermediaries

Despite this strong convergence, the CASP is not — and cannot be — a full replication of the MiFID investment firm. The most fundamental reason for this lies in the nature of crypto-assets themselves. MiCA applies only to crypto-assets that do not qualify as financial instruments. MiFID, conversely, applies exclusively to such instruments. The two regimes are thus mutually exclusive, yet structurally analogous. This paradox generates an unstable conceptual coexistence: CASPs resemble investment firms in their obligations, but they operate outside the perimeter that justifies those obligations in traditional financial law.

A second structural limit arises from decentralisation. The MiFID framework is predicated on the existence of identifiable, hierarchical intermediaries capable of exercising discretionary powers and implementing compliance measures. CASPs, however, frequently operate in environments where decentralised protocols, smart contracts and permissionless exchanges mediate transactions without any possibility of discretionary intervention. A MiFID intermediary can refuse a transaction, halt a trade or impose internal controls. A CASP interacting with a decentralised automated market maker cannot. The technical architecture of crypto markets thus constrains the regulatory identity of CASPs. Mifidisation cannot occur where no entity performs the functions MiFID presupposes.

Furthermore, MiCA does not replicate MiFID’s client categorisation, product governance rules, suitability and appropriateness assessments or the full spectrum of capital and liquidity requirements. These omissions are not accidental; they reflect the difficulty of imposing traditional financial logic on a technological environment where investment behaviour, market microstructure and intermediary roles differ fundamentally from those found in conventional markets.

IV. A Dual Market Structure: Mifidised CeFi and Autonomous DeFi

The partial mifidisation of CASPs produces a structural consequence: the segmentation of the crypto market into two distinct layers. On the one hand, centralised actors such as exchanges, custodians and brokers become progressively institutionalised, professionalised and assimilated to traditional investment intermediaries. Their regulatory identity increasingly resembles that of MiFID entities, even though they operate under MiCA. This centralised sphere, often referred to as CeFi, becomes the privileged target of supervisory oversight.

On the other hand, decentralised finance operates largely outside the CASP perimeter. Because DeFi protocols lack intermediaries and discretionary agents, they escape any meaningful mifidisation. They cannot be transformed into institutional actors, as their design intentionally eliminates the role of the intermediary. The coexistence of these two spheres creates a dual market structure: a regulated, mifidised centralised sector and an algorithmic, unregulated decentralised sector. This bifurcation is structurally embedded in MiCA and is likely to intensify as regulatory scrutiny increases.

This duality raises important doctrinal questions. If MiFID-like obligations apply only to centralised actors, while decentralised protocols remain essentially untouched, the regulatory burden may push innovation toward decentralised architectures. Conversely, institutional investors may prefer mifidised CASPs because they offer the legal certainty and operational predictability of traditional financial intermediaries. The crypto ecosystem may thus evolve into a hybrid model governed by two incompatible logics: institutional regulation and algorithmic self-organisation.

V. Prospects for Further Convergence: Is a Full Mifidisation Inevitable?

Several developments suggest that mifidisation may intensify. As tokenisation expands, an increasing number of assets traditionally governed by MiFID — equities, bonds and money-market instruments — will be issued, recorded or traded on distributed ledgers. This will blur the boundary between MiCA and MiFID, forcing CASPs to engage with MiFID norms or to become dual-regulated entities operating under both frameworks.

Supervisory practice may also drive convergence. ESMA and national authorities could interpret CASP obligations in a manner increasingly aligned with MiFID standards, particularly regarding organisational requirements, conflicts of interest and market integrity. This interpretative practice could generate a de facto mifidisation even without legislative amendment.

Economic dynamics further reinforce this trend. Large CASPs already exhibit characteristics of systemically important intermediaries. Their infrastructure, market share, client base and role in price discovery resemble the functions of regulated trading venues and brokers. As these entities grow, pressure may mount to impose MiFID-like obligations relating to prudential resilience, governance, client categorisation and product oversight.

Yet full mifidisation remains unlikely, for the simple reason that crypto markets are not structurally equivalent to financial markets. Their technological foundation — programmability, decentralisation and cryptographic execution — resists the institutional assumptions of MiFID. A complete convergence would require either a profound transformation of crypto market architecture or a reconceptualisation of MiFID’s regulatory premises.

Conclusion

The CASP regime under MiCA clearly reveals a movement of partial mifidisation: the borrowing of structural concepts, regulatory duties and supervisory logic from MiFID to shape the governance of crypto intermediaries. This movement is driven by functional necessity, regulatory pragmatism and the desire to embed crypto markets within a familiar normative framework.

However, mifidisation is constrained by the structural singularities of crypto markets. Decentralisation, automation and the absence of discretionary intermediaries prevent CASPs from fully embodying the institutional identity of MiFID investment firms. The result is a hybrid model: centralised actors become increasingly regulated in a MiFID-like manner, while decentralised protocols remain outside this institutional perimeter.

Whether mifidisation will deepen or recede depends on the evolution of market architecture, tokenisation, supervisory practice and the future interaction between MiCA and MiFID. For now, the CASP stands as a liminal figure — neither fully an investment firm nor entirely separate from the MiFID logic — and its ambiguous identity reflects the broader tension between institutional financial regulation and post-intermediary crypto ecosystems.

Key takeaway. MiCA’s CASP regime initiates a partial but structurally significant mifidisation of the crypto market. Yet the technological realities of decentralised and automated finance prevent a full replication of the MiFID model, leaving CASPs suspended between the worlds of traditional financial intermediation and post-intermediary crypto infrastructures.